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Outsourcing the ‘best interests’ of unaccompanied asylum seeking children in the era of 
austerity 
Rachel Humphris and Nando Sigona 
 
 
Abstract 
This article examines the governance of unaccompanied asylum seeking children 
(UASC) and former UASC in the UK and reveals the expanding reach of asylum 
privatisation to unaccompanied children. In the process, the principle of the ‘best interests of 
the child’ enshrined in international and national law is being reconfigured through practices 
of service outsourcing and out-of-county placement that are used to distance local authorities 
(LAs) from their statutory responsibilities. Drawing on a mixed-methods approach that 
combines quantitative data on the distribution and circumstances of UASC and in-depth 
qualitative interviews with service providers, we identify three intertwining processes that 
contribute to redefining ‘best interests’: firstly, the increasing distance in goals and priorities 
of managers and frontline workers is exacerbated by the emergence of new actors operating 
within the for-profit sector; secondly, decisions based on budget saving goals lead to young 
people being moved around the country undermining their capacity to access support; thirdly, 
restructuring and mainstreaming services for UASC misplace the expertise needed in this 
complex area. As a result of these processes, spaces for resisting such changes are 
increasingly restricted and ‘best interests’ are reshaped in ways which frontline workers think 
may be detrimental to the wellbeing of children and young people. 
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Introduction 
This article investigates the governance of unaccompanied asylum seeking children 
(UASC)
i
 and former unaccompanied children, or ‘care leavers’ii in the UK focusing on how 
these processes unfold at the local level in the so-called era of austerity. It frames the analysis 
of the empirical data in a context marked by the neoliberalisation of the state and the 
consolidation of a global migration and refugee industry. It identifies changes in the current 
system that can be traced back to the expansion of market logics and private actors in the 
asylum system driven by the policy goal of creating a ‘hostile environment’ for all migrants. 
The main contribution of this article is to cast light on the expanding reach of asylum 
privatisation to unaccompanied migrant children and how it impacts on frontline social 
workers who must abide by changing duties and demands informed by austerity-driven goals 
while also seeking to defend the best interests of children in their care
iii
. 
Until recently lone asylum seeking children have remained relatively sheltered from 
the marketization of asylum, if not from increasingly hostile migration and refugee policies 
(Crawley 2006; Bhabha and Schmidt 2008), with local authorities (LA) retaining a strong 
mandate to look after them enshrined in the law. In this article we empirically investigate 
how the marketization of asylum generates new actors, and different priorities in the 
governance of unaccompanied children and how statutory and non-statutory actors, operating 
within not-for-profit and for-profit logics, adjust their daily interactions in four localities
iv
. 
Rather than weakening state power, these commissioning arrangements signal a consistent 
mode of state governance that diffuses power through targets and funding mechanisms 
(Dubois 2014: 46). Ultimately, we argue that the principle of the ‘best interests of the child’ 
is being reconfigured by the market logic whereby UASCs are increasingly commodified as 
‘raw materials for private profit’ (Welch 2000: 73; Menjívar and Perreira:forthcoming), and 
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practices of service outsourcing and out-of-county placement are used to distance LAs from 
their statutory responsibility to act in the best interests of this population (see Gill 2016).  
This article fills an important gap in knowledge regarding how policies are 
implemented and services are provided to UASC in the UK in the age of austerity policies. 
We present the first nation-wide mapping of how unaccompanied children are moved across 
the country, and, drawing on in-depth qualitative interviews with frontline workers, we shed 
light on how and why children are moved and with what effects. The article is divided into 
three parts: firstly, we outline the position of unaccompanied asylum seeking children in the 
British legal system and discuss where and with whom responsibilities lie for the ‘best 
interests’ of UASC. We also consider the changes introduced to the protection system since 
austerity measures were introduced in 2010. Secondly, the article places these systemic 
changes in the context of the neoliberalisation of the state, in particular the scaling back of 
local services following the financial crisis of the early 2000s, the emergency of for-profit 
logics within public services particularly with regard to the governance of asylum. Thirdly, 
drawing on the responses to Freedom of Information (FOI) requests to all LAs in England 
and in-depth qualitative interviews with statutory and non-statutory actors involved in the 
governance of UASCs at strategic and frontline levels, we demonstrate how market logics are 
infiltrating the care and support provided to UASC and reshaping the relationship between 
different actors tasked to ensure their ‘best interests’. Finally, we identify the spaces and 
tactics of resistance that some frontline workers mobilise to ensure children’s best interests 
remain at the core of their practice. 
Methodology 
The paper draws on a mixed-methods research approach that combines a Freedom of 
Information (FOI) request survey of all LAs in England with in-depth semi-structured 
interviews in four localities. Nation-wide data on unaccompanied children in the UK are 
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patchy and mostly cover issues related to the legal status. Due to their statutory responsibility, 
LAs are best placed to collect data on outcomes for young people. Therefore to address the 
data gap, we submitted FOI requests in order to build a national map of UASCs and former 
UASCs from local level data. The limitations of FOI requests such as their potential to 
provide a skewed overview of the data were overcome through our mixed methods approach. 
The FOI questions were designed to complement and contextualise the qualitative interviews 
(Savage and Hyde 2014). In addition, the research team employed an iterative process 
through continuing discussions with those completing the FOI request to ensure that the most 
relevant and comparable data were obtained (Walby and Larsen 2012). The FOI request 
asked nine questions about the numbers, profiles, definitions and policies relating to  UASCs 
and former UASC care leavers who have reached 18 years old for a three-year period (2012-
2015) (Humphris and Sigona 2016). It was sent to 152 LAs in November 2015 and 141 
responses were received (93%).  
Utilising the data from the FOI requests, we chose four LAs with differing and 
contrasting characteristics to carry out a more in-depth analysis of FOI findings. The LAs 
were chosen because they represented a wide geographical spread across England and have 
high or mid-ranking numbers of UASC and care leavers ranging from 16 to 147. In addition, 
they represent a mix of responses from the FOI request including numbers of missing 
children; support granted in addition to Home Office grant funding; Human Rights 
Assessments and support for appeal rights exhausted young people. The LAs included one 
metropolitan district council, one non-metropolitan district council, one unitary authority and 
one London borough council (See Appendix). Three areas were in the top ten most deprived 
LAs in England and one was in the top twenty (Office of National Statistics 2015). 
Interviews were conducted between January and July 2016 in four locations across 
England. Interviewees were sampled to cover different service providers and models of 
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organisation (statutory and non-statutory or profit and not-for-profit). Having gained full 
ethical approval by the University of Oxford’s Research Ethics Committee (CUREC), 
representatives from organisations providing services for UASC were contacted and asked 
for an interview (see Appendix).  
The majority of interviews were conducted in the interviewees’ place of work or in a 
convenient location where they felt comfortable. Interviews lasted between one and two 
hours and were recorded and transcribed in full. Data were anonymised during the 
transcription process and identifying codes were allocated to each transcript. Data were coded 
using a computer-assisted thematic analysis approach (Guest et al. 2011) to identify the key 
issues raised by respondents.  This involved interpretive code-and-retrieve methods wherein 
the data was transcribed and read by the research team who together identified codes and then 
undertook an interpretative thematic analysis.  The quotations used in this paper were 
selected on the basis of their ability to illustrate those issues. 
Legal boundaries of protection for unaccompanied asylum seeking children in the UK 
Children’s rights are internationally enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (UN General Assembly 1989, henceforth CRC) ratified by all United Nations member 
states, except for the United States. International instruments, such as the CRC, formally 
offer considerable protection to migrant children regardless of their legal status (CRC 
General Comment No. 6). However, the enforcement of such international legal instruments 
depends crucially on their incorporation into domestic law. In the UK, for example, the CRC 
was ratified in 1991 but its incorporation into national law took much longer. The Children 
Act 2004 introduced the duty of regard for the welfare of children to all state agencies 
(noteworthy is the initial exclusion of the Border Agency). It also set out a statutory 
framework for local co-operation to protect children. All organisations with responsibility for 
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services to children must make arrangements to ensure that in discharging their functions 
they safeguard and promote the welfare of children. 
Local authorities have duties to support all children ‘in need’ in their area. The basic 
scheme for supporting children in need is found in Part III of the Children Act 1989. In 
contrast to adult asylum-seekers and families who are provided with asylum support from the 
Home Office, LAs are responsible for supporting unaccompanied asylum-seeking children. 
LAs receive funding from the Home Office for this, paid at a daily rate, by sending monthly 
returns, though this funding does not necessarily cover all the costs involved. Unaccompanied 
children are eligible for all services that are provided by the LA to all children in their care in 
the UK including education, housing and health services. The LA may work in partnership 
with other public agencies, the voluntary sector, children and young people, parents and 
carers, and the wider community in order to safeguard and promote the welfare of children.  
Despite these legal safeguards, research in the UK indicates how precarious migration 
statuses impact on children’s livelihoods, everyday lives and life chances (Anderson 2007; 
O’Connell Davidson and Farrow 2007; Sigona and Hughes 2012; Bloch et al. 2014; Chase 
2010). A further barrier to an unaccompanied child accessing support is the LA disputing the 
age of a child (Cemlyn and Nye 2012; Chase 2006; Hjern et al.  2012). There are also 
concerns that unaccompanied children cannot access sufficient and effective legal protection 
following changes to funding legal aid (Connolly and Pinter 2015). The obstacles for migrant 
children to access services has led scholars to argue that children in the immigration system 
are treated primarily as migrants, and only secondly as children with particular rights and 
needs (Crawley 2006; Sawyer 2006; Giner 2007). Policy-making for migrant children has 
been characterised by oscillation between greater restrictions – in line with the overall trend 
in asylum and migration policy making (Zetter et al. 2003, Geddes 2003) – and targeted 
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policy concessions to accommodate rising internal and international concerns relating to the 
treatment of child migrants. 
The UK Home Office definition of an Unaccompanied Asylum Seeking Child 
(UASC) is a person under 18, who is applying for asylum in his or her own right, and is 
separated from both parents and not being cared for by an adult who in law or by custom has 
responsibility to do so. The duty of care for these children is governed by the Children Act 
1989 (as amended by the Children and Young Persons Act 2008). When a child reaches 18 
years old the duty to the young person is held within the Care Leavers (England) Regulations 
2010. This Act was amended in 2014 to require that such duties are fulfilled with particular 
regard to the child's circumstances and needs as unaccompanied or trafficked. Data are 
particularly scarce for former UASC care leavers and their trajectories once they reach 18 
years and are no longer considered to be a ‘child’.v The Immigration Act 2016 changes the 
nature of support for UASC care leavers who have exhausted their appeal rights (‘Appeal 
Rights Exhausted’ or ARE). Former lone children who have reached adulthood in the UK and 
have not established a protection claim for asylum will no longer be supported by LAs but by 
the Home Office. This signals an erosion of the capacity of LAs to define and protect the best 
interests of lone children and care leavers under their care.  
A further policy change was introduced in July 2016 that allows the duty of care for a 
child to be formally ‘transferred’ from one LA to another. The ‘transfer protocol’ does not 
replace the previous system (out-of-county placements still occur where only the child is 
moved, rather than both the child and the statutory duty to care for the child) however, the 
transfer of duty of care from one LA to another is crucial because it indicates the movement 
of budget responsibility for the child and therefore reflects the different logic that underpins 
the new system. The protocol was established in order to ‘ensure that any LA does not face 
an unmanageable responsibility in accommodating and looking after UASC simply by virtue 
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of being the point of arrival of a disproportionate number of UASC’ (Home Office, 2016). 
The transfer protocol establishes that an ‘unmanageable responsibility’ is above 0.07% 
UASC to child population. Previously, wherever a child came to the attention of a LA, the 
same LA would take responsibility for the child. The transfer protocol came into effect after 
we completed the interviews detailed in this article, however it is important to note these 
policy changes as they demonstrates the shift in the underlying logic for looking after 
UASC
vi
. This protocol therefore formalises the changes that witnessed throughout our 
research. The defining characteristic of providing children’s services to UASC has now been 
unsettled to one that paves the way for children to be looked after where they do not represent 
a ‘burden’ on the LA concerned, this term constituting a fundamental shift in the way lone 
children are framed in policy discourse. 
The responsibility for UASCs is devolved to LAs in the UK. Although statutory 
provisions contain guidance regarding the care UASC and former UASC care leavers should 
receive, little is known about the implementation of these policies at the local level. Previous 
research shows that the treatment of UASC varies considerably across LAs in the UK (Kohli 
& Mitchell 2007; Matthews 2014; Stanley 2001; Wade et al. 2005; UNHCR/UNICEF 2016) 
since LAs interpret their duty vis-à-vis UASC and former UASC differently.   
Repeated cuts to LA budgets due to austerity measures, fuelled by the 2007 financial 
crisis, have further polarised such experiences with more wealthy LAs being able to maintain 
services no longer available or only partially available elsewhere (Connolly & Pinter 2015). 
Budget reductions have led to the fragmentation of public services through the imposition of 
financial targets in welfare services and the rise of ‘new public management’(Andersen 2005; 
Clarke 2005). These reforms have also impacted on children’s services and adversely 
affected frontline practice, particularly that of social workers (Hek et al. 2012; Jones 2015; 
Parton 2011; Rogowski 2011; Sidebotham 2012).  
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In this article we argue that the austerity-driven rollback of the welfare state (see 
Blyth 2013) and the increasing pressure for LAs to cut budgets shape the care provided to 
unaccompanied children. First, formal and informal systems of outsourcing care and support 
are being created, framed mostly in a dual narrative of ‘burden sharing’ and ‘efficiency/value 
for money’. Unaccompanied children are increasingly relocated to different areas of the UK. 
We compare the narratives of frontline workers and the conflicting and converging 
justifications of these processes and their effects. Second, there is a tension between those 
who manage children’s services and are tasked with cutting budgets, managing Home Office 
funding regulations and implementing a narrowing definition of safeguarding and those at the 
frontline who are trying to balance children’s best interests within a tightening migration 
system designed to make the UK an increasingly hostile environment for all migrants (The 
Telegraph 2012). Third, paths of everyday resistance are created.   
The privatisation of asylum 
For Macklin (2002: 2018), given ‘the apparent political consensus affirming the 
state’s monopoly to police borders, immigration policy seems an unpromising place to look 
for evidence of privatization, if by this one means the retraction of the state ’. Nonetheless, 
we are witnessing a twin process of privatization and delegation in which states gradually 
delegate authority and outsource services from governmental administrative agencies to 
private and other non-state actors (Kritzman-Amir 2011: 199-200). 
The call for the private ‘for profit’ sector to play an enhanced role in the refugee 
regime has reached unprecedented height during the Mediterranean refugee crisis and the 
quest for sustainable solutions to forced displacement. The New York Declaration signed off 
by world leaders at the United Nations for Refugees and Migrants summit in September 2016 
included thirteen references to the ‘private sector’ and its role in the emerging global 
migration and refugee governance (UN 2016). But the involvement of the private sector in 
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the governance of migration and asylum is not new, neither at the global level or in 
industrialised western states (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sorensen 2013; Betts 2013). The 
involvement of private contractors in the immigrants’ detention business in the US (Golash-
Boza 2015) is perhaps the first large scale example at the national level of the emergence of 
the migration industry. Border technology contractors have gained pace more recently 
following the alleged failures of ‘fortress Europe’ (Andersson  2014; Menjívar and Perreira: 
forthcoming). 
Betts (2013) argues that a rising number of actors, primarily profit-motivated, engage 
in activities relating to human mobility and exercise a growing influence on the way global 
migration and refugee regimes operate and evolve. Operating on different geographical 
scales, these new actors can be located along a wide spectrum that goes from international 
criminal networks facilitating irregular border crossings in breach of national laws, to 
multinational corporations interested in corporate social responsibility and to be associated 
with humanitarian agencies for brand development, to border technology firms sourcing 
drones and high-tech sensors to states to stop irregular migrants, and not-for-profit local 
service providers who have taken  on responsibility for front-line services from the 
neoliberalised state (Menz 2013). The involvement of new actors in the asylum system 
generates new policy dynamics as they ‘bring their own agendas and interests to the table, 
influencing the politics and economy of asylum regimes’ (Kritzman-Amir 2011: 200). Menz 
(2013: 111) identifies three ways in which this shift creates new policy dynamics: (1) ‘path-
dependent lock in effects’ produce their own self-perpetuating and self-justifying logic; (2) 
‘regulatory capture’ makes the system more complex so that it enables private actors to exert 
their ‘expertise’ and influence policy decision making; (3) outsourcing distances the state 
from legal liability and political accountability (see Gill 2016). Betts also observes together 
with the growing role of private actors, the emergence of so-called ‘markets for migration’, 
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defined as the way in which human mobility, particularly with regards to facilitation, control 
and rescue, is ‘increasingly subject to processes of commodification and competitive 
exchange’ (2013:45). 
In the UK, for-profit actors rapidly expanded their reach in the asylum system since 
the early 2010s. ‘From the profits made by private security firms from the UK’s detention 
estate to exploitative charges for poor legal advice, asylum has been an issue of public policy 
from which profit has long been sought’ (Darling 2016: 2). The introduction of the 
COMPASS contracts in 2012 which outsourced accommodation provision for asylum seekers 
to large multinational firms in UK however is deemed a turning point in what Darling (2016) 
convincingly describes as the privatisation of asylum in the UK. These contracts transferred 
accommodation provision from a mixture of consortia of LAs, social housing associations 
and providers to just three private contractors. Crucially, increasing subcontracting of 
services reshapes the relationships between different organisations supporting lone children 
with legal migration status issues. Rather than weakening state power, these commissioning 
arrangements signal a consistent mode of state governance that diffuses power through 
targets and funding mechanisms (Dubois 2014: 46). 
In this article, we argue that the privatisation of asylum and the creation of market 
logics is gradually co-opting the governance of unaccompanied children through outsourcing 
of services, weakening of the LA’s duty of care vis-à-vis UASC and geographically 
distancing them through out-of-county placement. 
 
Outsourcing UASC’s ‘best interests’ 
This section presents our quantitative data to demonstrate that use of ‘out-of-county 
placements’ for unaccompanied children has increased, while at the same time knowledge of 
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this practice in the receiving LAs has decreased. Successively, qualitative interview data with 
frontline workers is used to identify why children are being moved and the impacts for 
frontline workers who are tasked with upholding unaccompanied children’s best interests. We 
argue that different logics justify placing children ‘out-of-county’ and these rationalities 
affect how best interests of the child are considered. Finally this section foregrounds the 
additional bureaucratic barriers that children face in transition at 16, 18 or when support 
ceases at 21 or 25 years old, further illustrating how the new system places frontline actors in 
a position where they become less able to define and act upon their assessment of a child’s 
best interests.  
The responses from the FOI requests provided an indication of the complex picture of 
the regional differences between LAs regarding the care of UASC. The FOI requests revealed 
that increasing numbers of children are placed outside the LA responsible for their care, and 
fewer children are formally known to the LA in which they are physically placed. For 
example only 17 LAs reported that they had been informed that a UASC had been placed in 
their LA from a different LA. 
Table 1 here 
It is important to note that the receiving LA is notified that the child placed in their 
geographical jurisdiction is a looked-after-child, but not that they are an asylum seeker. 
Therefore there is no national picture available of where UASC children are moved. 
However, the new empirical data we gained from FOI requests provide an indication of the 
‘sending’ LAs as we illustrate in Map One.    
Map 1 here 
The map we produced from our FOI requests illustrates the widespread phenomenon 
of moving children from the LA which holds the statutory duty to look after them. Crucially, 
the FOI requests could not generate data on where children were relocated or the reason for 
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their placement outside of the responsible LA. Therefore, we conducted qualitative 
interviews to explore the justifications and effects of placing children outside the LA with the 
duty to care for them. The following section uses the data gained from qualitative interviews 
with frontline workers to argue that the logics that justify placing children ‘out-of-county’ 
erode the best interests of the child through this practice.  
Justifications for moving children 
Placing children in different LAs was frequently justified in terms of cost savings and 
the lack of affordable accommodation. Less attention was given to the capacity of LAs to 
fulfil their duty of care towards outplaced UASC. This approach manifests from the moment 
a child comes to the attention of the state. The child becomes a site of contention between 
neighbouring social services foregrounding the salience of geographical borders because of 
the financial implications of assuming duty of care. An NGO worker commented: 
‘they have batted the child back to the previous [LA]. You know somebody has got 
off a lorry in xx that is another LA. So they are trying to bat it back to the previous 
LA because it is all about money today isn’t it?’ (LA 2).  
Similar descriptions of LA practices emerged across the four localities highlighting how LAs 
try to restrict the number of UASC children in their care. As an NGO worker described ‘Most 
young people get off in xx. The head of service is very good at asking where exactly the 
young people got off and if it is one metre over the city boundary then they won’t take them’ 
(NGO worker, LA 4). Budget restrictions for UASC therefore shape the responses and 
relationships between frontline workers and children from the outset and reinforce the policy 
construction of the children as a financial and political burden.  
The pressure on frontline services and the subsequent redefinition of ‘best interests’ 
are brought into stark relief by how services are restricted. For example, children do not gain 
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the educational support they are entitled to when they are moved to a different geographical 
area. An NGO worker stated: 
‘there is a guy who works in college, he is called the Skills Coordinator, for all care 
leavers. Young people who are not supported by our LA don’t get his support… they 
are just completely outside of the system’ (NGO worker LA 1).  
In addition, the outplaced child has a weakened link to their social worker and the ‘receiving’ 
social services have no duty or reason to support the child in their area. Where frontline 
workers endeavour to informally fill this gap, a tension emerges with managers who are 
required to implement budget cuts. As one retired school teacher describes,  
‘I had a wonderful boss he helped us set up a special project in a school here and so 
we took all those kids into that project and it all kick started as it were.  And we also 
took a lot of young people from xx as well, which was really the death knell for it 
because no-one was paying for their provision.  And when we only had very few 
youngsters from here and a lot from xx they got wise to it and decided that they would 
pull the rug out from under it’ (retired school teacher LA 3).  
It is important to note that young people who are in need of foster care whether they 
have migration status issues or not, are also subject to out of county placements around the 
UK. However, unaccompanied children have specific issues that are exacerbated by 
movement from their social worker. Social workers consistently stated that the main 
differences between UASC and other looked after children was the lack of history and 
awareness of the child’s ‘background’. This lack of information about a child is intensified by 
moving young people out of the LA that has a duty to care for them. The intersection of 
geographical and bureaucratic borders affects the legal, education and mental health services 
provided to young people. Placing children out-of-county makes it increasingly difficult for 
service providers to provide support that serves their best interests. Two further justifications 
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were described for moving children ‘out-of-county’. The first was linked to lack of 
alternatives by one social worker:  
‘There are rules that say you should place everybody in the borough… but quite often 
you haven’t got a choice’ (Social worker, LA 3). 
Children who are under 16 years old must, according to statutory guidelines, be placed in 
foster care. In practice, however, there is a national shortage of foster carers in the UK and 
social workers commented that recruiting and training foster carers is expensive and time-
consuming. Therefore short term savings were made to limit spending on training foster 
carers resulting in longer term expenditure and reduced services. Often, LAs are forced to use 
a centralised private fostering agency which is more expensive than having their own trained 
foster carers as explained by a social worker: ‘there are massive cost implications because 
they’re in independent fostering agencies. So the placement is around £1000 a week’ (Social 
worker, LA 1).  
Finally, it is important to note that a different logic was expressed by social workers 
in a LA which was not subject to such strict budget cuts. A social worker described how she 
could choose where to place the lone children the LA had a duty to support, 
‘it is very white and middle class and not culturally appropriate for them here. In xx 
there are culturally appropriate foster carers or flats. I really care about the young 
people. And I fight for them. I want good experiences. Good service for them, good 
legal support, I go with them to all of their appointments.  Some LAs don’t have 
capacity to that.’ (Social worker LA 4) 
This distinction illustrates the ability of frontline workers to define children’s best interests 
differently when they have resources. Although children are moved in LA4, the social worker 
has the capacity to maintain a strong supporting role. The different justifications are crucial to 
the trajectory of the UASC through the support system, particularly at transition stages.   
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Outsourcing and risks at transition 
As shown above, cost was often the defining justification for moving children, 
increasing their risks at transition stages such as the age for compulsory foster care (16 years 
old); moving into care leaving services (18 years old); or when the LA ceases to support them 
(if they become ‘appeal rights exhausted’). For example, one NGO worker commented that a 
LA immediately placed children in cheaper semi-independent accommodation when they 
reached 16 years old rather than keeping them with foster carers due to cost ‘We had an issue 
with xx – budget requirements meant they had to be pulled back to xx. They were pulled back 
as soon as they hit 16’ (NGO worker LA 4). Movement around the country can erode young 
peoples’ support networks and education. An NGO worker commented ‘there are a few 
young people at college who are looked after outside of xx.  I mean the issue for example for 
one of them is he is becoming eighteen and he is not going to be housed in here. So this is 
where he has got all his roots, he has had his foster placement here, he is at college here’ 
(NGO worker LA 1). Furthermore, if a young person becomes appeal rights exhausted they 
are stranded in a LA that has no record of them or duty to support them. A team manager in 
one LA said ‘if the local authority was holding people on to 21 years old and then simply 
saying that the leaving care provisions had come to an end, they can just literally withdraw 
accommodation and that person will effectively end up being homeless in a completely 
different part of the country. This may increase the risks of homelessness amongst that group 
in that area if the other authority starts cutting off support.’ (LA manager LA 3). 
This section has explored how the neoliberalisation of the state manifests in the 
complex intersections of geographical and bureaucratic borders for children who are subject 
to immigration control, in particular justifications for moving children are primarily based on 
cost savings. Children’s best interests are redefined when social workers, guided by budget 
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cuts, have no choice regarding their placement. The ‘sending’ LA is not able to define and act 
upon a child’s best interests when they are ‘out-of-county’ due to resource constraints and 
lack of geographical proximity compounded by bureaucratic boundaries. The ‘receiving’ LA 
is not aware that looked after children placed in their area are asylum seekers. If the child is 
brought to the attention of the ‘receiving’ LA they operate a ‘gate-keeping mentality’ in order 
to protect their budgets. This section has also argued that the effects of this movement, 
coupled with the justification for movement which is focused on cost, are heightened during 
transitions at certain ages (16, 18 and leaving care) which are inextricably linked to the grants 
provided by the Home Office to LAs at these different life stages.  
 
The marketization of children’s asylum system and everyday practices of resistance 
The responses to limitations imposed by budget cuts and restructuring services are 
shaped by different actors’ experiences, background and institutional positions. Social 
workers identified how standard practices were being eroded ‘some principles like a social 
worker going with a child to an appointment with the Home Office, a few years back that 
would have been the basic procedure… whereas now you will get a social worker say they 
can’t go along, the child will have to go on their own’ (personal advisor LA 3). The 
restructuring of UASC children’s services was viewed as positive in principle because it was 
purportedly implemented through the rationale of mainstreaming. However, in practice it 
exacerbated problems of budget reductions,  
‘I think definitely their [social workers] heart is in the right place. But because there is 
no central team. A person might only have one or two asylum seekers on their 
particular case load… So because they are being spread out across a number of areas I 
think the knowledge base is less (NGO worker LA 2).’   
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Social workers’ increasing workload with decreasing resources and the mainstreaming of 
UASC in broader children’s services, it was said, has led to a reprioritisation of the client 
group and, contextually, to the shrinking of the definition of safeguarding towards UASC. A 
manager in a LA Children’s services department stated that: 
‘I mean I know that potentially councils should be working closely with some of the 
legal advisers in their authorities, but there is a dwindling pot of money and you know 
there are other pressures… These are all like pie in the sky things that no-one has got 
any time for…’ (LA manager LA 3).   
Due to restructuring and budget limitations, previous basic standards become ‘utopian goals’. 
Crucially, it was noted that social workers have decreasing capacity to define the terms on 
which they are able to conduct their work.  
One example of this reduced capacity is the pressure on social workers to conduct 
Human Rights Assessments and withdraw support from UASC care leavers who have not 
been able to establish a successful protection claim. This practice also contradicts the purpose 
of care leaving services to provide support for young people in order for them to successfully 
transition to adulthood, ‘we will do whatever we are allowed to do under the legislation, but 
that is when it cuts off and the Children’s Act just becomes null and void. The Immigration 
Act, it is the Act.  So yes it is very stressful for everybody concerned’ (Social worker 
manager LA 2). The additional demands on social workers and the contradictions of these 
demands with professional standards may also shift definitions of best interests, ‘social 
workers start to disengage to protect themselves because they can’t do anything that is 
outside their statutory duty’ (NGO worker LA 4). 
Budget pressures therefore lead to abrupt separations between young people and 
social workers, described as also being shaped by the increasingly pervasive influence of the 
Home Office. A social worker stated that ‘any person at twenty-one that ends their care we 
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don’t say “Go away and never talk to us again”.  You know I always say “look this is my 
mobile, if you are in a crisis or you need signposting anywhere let me know.” But if the 
Home Office ask I have an obligation to tell them where they are living’ (Social worker LA 
2). The lack of resources leads social workers to draw support from the Home Office despite 
recognising this may have adverse consequences for young people,  
‘Now it is the Home Office that runs voluntary return and I emailed them months ago 
about one person, they have not got back to me, so I don’t know how efficient that is.  
That would be my main worry.  Certainly as far as our resources are concerned - great 
- and if the Home Office are prepared to do a good job supporting people, then fair 
enough, because you know we haven’t got the money really to do the job that I think 
is necessary. But I think more likely they will just get scared and go underground’ 
(Social worker LA 1).  
As a result of these statutory obligations to notify the Home Office of young people’s 
whereabouts, trust in social workers was said to be jeopardised by those who should be 
working in partnership with them to ensure the best interests of the child are maintained. An 
ESOL teacher noted that, ‘They all say that they don’t know how much to trust their social 
workers because their social workers do have a role which is linked to the Home Office’ 
(ESOL teacher LA 1).  
 Yet the positioning and power of the Home Office was said to not only affect young 
people’s relationships with social workers but also the interface with other services. Social 
workers were said to be constantly negotiating access for young people, ‘I think the hardest 
bit for us is the fact that everything is different.  You go to the hospital with them; it is not 
“are you ill?  What is wrong with you?”  It is; “are you allowed to be here?  Have you got a 
national insurance number?” They ask that before they ask you what is wrong.  And surely 
that is the wrong way round’ (Housing manager LA 4). Children’s best interests, therefore, 
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are shaped by the tightening immigration system that aims to make the UK an increasingly 
hostile environment for all migrants.  
 These changes were also explained in very negative terms by social workers. Those 
who did not shift their modes of working in response to new targets and limitations became 
physically unwell, placing more pressure on those who remained. One former social worker 
reflected that the combination of the growing role of the Home Office; the lack of support to 
cope with supporting lone children with trauma; and the limitations of her role spurred her to 
quit: ‘I didn’t want to do that [the team manager role] because I didn’t want to do the Home 
Office’s work, which I felt it would be.  I did feel quite powerless… (Independent advocate 
LA 3). Social workers are torn by opposing pressures of the Home Office on one hand, and 
the duties and responsibilities of children’s services on the other.  
 Moreover, as more experienced social workers leave the profession, newly qualified 
social workers were reported as being employed. A personal advisor noted that ‘you get rid of 
the older ones because they earn too much money and then you bring in younger ones straight 
from university because you can pay them half  price’ (Personal advisor LA 1). Fewer and 
less well qualified or experienced social workers, it was said, can leave young people without 
a social worker for months. This can have an impact on their legal case as young people may 
fail to access expert advice at a crucial stage in their asylum claim as a social worker 
explained ‘the UASC team at the moment I know that they are really under strain, 
completely.  I know that they are completely understaffed because they are hiring three 
students. I’m not sure that is completely wise because they are under-qualified and it is a 
really complex area’ (Social worker LA 1).  
Discretion and everyday resistance 
Room for manoeuvre to define and enact children’s best interests often relies on the 
experience of social workers. For example, one social worker who was not under such strict 
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managerial control and had worked in her role for decades commented that she complies with 
the Home Office legislation but ensures that she protects children where she can: ‘I’ve never 
shared an age assessment with the Home Office. I just provide the back sheet. You have to 
work with the Home Office but there are things you can do’ (Social worker LA 4). Tactics 
also rely on long-standing and trusting relationships between statutory and non-statutory 
workers. However, these relationships are damaged by high staff turnover; increasingly strict 
patrolling of social workers’ time and duties; and the decline of NGOs working on these 
issues. One NGO worker commented how social workers used their discretion to uphold their 
definition of a child’s best interests,  
‘I had one social worker call up and say, “this is what my manager’s saying… I can’t 
say this to the young person or anybody. Why don’t you consider getting them a 
solicitor to challenge it?” This happens when you have a really good relationship with 
social workers. I can find ways to challenge things higher up that social workers 
can’t’ (NGO worker LA 4).   
However, without close and long-standing relationships between statutory and non-statutory 
workers these tactics cannot be deployed to protect the erosion of children’s best interests.  
Increasing subcontracting of services reshapes the relationships between different 
organisations supporting lone children with migration issues. For example, LAs commission 
private housing companies to provide accommodation for former UASC care leavers. 
Housing providers are solely funded by LAs who, in turn, receive a grant from the Home 
Office. Larger, ‘for-profit’ housing providers can provide cheaper housing. They also employ 
support workers who are constrained by targets and limited funding, reducing relationship 
building and capacities for resistance. For example, housing support workers witnessed 
Home Office staff entering accommodation to deport a young person: ‘It was 
horrendous…Yes I mean he was in tears, kind of begged me to stop them, but I couldn’t 
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really do anything, so they took him and the other three [young people] absolutely lost it, they 
were like ‘Who are these people, what happened to our friend, why did they come to our 
house’.  And unfortunately we can’t do anything you know.  We can’t hide them or stop them 
from coming into our house, stop the Home Office from coming to our houses. It is a very 
difficult position to be in’ (Housing support worker LA 4).  
Not only do housing providers witness young people being taken into detention with a 
sense of powerlessness, they are also co-opted to enforce border regulations. As one housing 
support worker stated, ‘Yes we have had to evict people because they have turned twenty-one 
but they still didn’t have a decision. But we just have to do what we are told.’ (Housing 
support worker LA 1). As the funding for housing is provided directly from the LA who 
gains a grant from the Home Office, the subcontracted housing support worker becomes the 
‘face of the state’ enforcing border controls to make a former unaccompanied child destitute 
and homeless. However, the raison d’être of the housing provider is significant. For example, 
one manager of a large private housing provider that operates in many cities across England 
responded to their role of enforcing border regulations with a sense of resignation, ‘we are a 
housing provider and not a charity’ (for-profit housing manager LA 1). In contrast, a smaller 
not-for-profit organisation in one area is trying to establish a new system for those who 
become destitute ‘what I am trying to do is I am trying to find money, if I can find the money, 
if I can get someone to fund me, I could open another house.  And I could open a house that 
helps destitute people; that at least gives them something to eat, somewhere to sleep, whilst 
everything is ongoing’ (not-for-profit housing manager LA 4).  
Similar differences were reflected in legal representation. Private solicitors 
maintained that they could not offer free legal advice for lone children who fell outside the 
increasingly strict criteria for legal aid. However, legal centres described how ‘we try and 
work out what we might be able to do and how we can get round it.  Like the last set of big 
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cuts, the cuts to legal aid that meant that half of the cases that had been funded up until that 
time were no longer funded.  And so we have had to think about either devising new ways of 
doing things or what we will do for free’ (Law centre solicitor LA 3).  
 This section has reviewed how statutory and non-statutory frontline workers’ actions 
converge or conflict under the trend towards redefining children’s best interests through 
weakening the capacities of social workers and their link with the children they support. The 
narratives of frontline workers reveal differences between non-statutory for profit and not-
for-profit actors. Although there has been a delegation of power to external agencies, this 
diffusion of duties does not represent a weakening of state power but rather a reformulation 
through ‘discretion’, targets and funding streams. Spaces to form relationships that might 
incubate tactics of everyday resistance are lost at the same time as room for manoeuvre is 
tightened. 
Conclusions 
This article has argued that the principle of the ‘best interests of the child’ is being 
reconfigured through expanding market logics in the asylum system, leading to prioritising 
cost over care of lone children and young people. The new push towards privatising services 
and the weakening of their link with LAs are restricting social workers’ capacity to define 
and act upon their assessment of a child’s best interests.  
We identified how changes introduced to the protection system in line with the 
consolidation of an asylum industry in the UK since recent austerity measures has shaped 
services in three ways. First, we explored the tensions that emerge due the many different 
priorities in the governance of unaccompanied children. Increasing distance between the aims 
of managers and those at the frontline is exacerbated by the emergence of new actors 
operating within not-for-profit and for-profit logics leaving unaccompanied children in 
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bureaucratic limbo. Second, we traced the formal and informal systems of out-of-county 
placement and the different justifications through which unaccompanied children are 
increasingly relocated to different areas of the UK. While this does not per se result in the 
erosion of best interests, we argue that when the primary rationale of the relocation is making 
budget savings, it may result in young people being accommodated at great distance with 
severe impacts on their social networks and their capacity to access their social worker is 
curtailed. Third, we examined new paths of everyday resistance to the advancing 
marketization of child asylum seekers and the coping strategies of frontline workers as they 
balance the conflicting rationales of migration control, budget cuts and best interests of the 
child. However, restructuring and mainstreaming UASC children’s services due to restricted 
resources has diluted or misplaced the expertise needed in this complex area. Experienced 
social workers are replaced by the newly qualified, intensifying this process. In addition, staff 
turn-over unsettles the longstanding relationships that can incubate tactics of resistance. 
These relationships are more difficult to establish and maintain due to commissioning 
arrangements and private partnerships.  
The article has illustrated how changes in the governance of UASCs may jeopardise 
the relationship between social workers, other frontline workers and lone children, which 
previously protected them from the pervading ‘hostile climate’ for all asylum seekers. The 
contradictions between frontline workers’ professional standards and the terms through which 
they are able to fulfil their statutory duties are heightened, restricting spaces for resistance 
and reconfiguring ‘best interests’ in ways which are detrimental to the wellbeing of children 
and young people.  
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Table 1: Geographical placement and knowledge of placement by year 
 
 2013 2014 2015 
Placed outside 
responsible LA 
616 632 872 
Known to LA where 
placed 
147 86 57 
Total number of UASC 
in England (FOI data) 
1866 1939 2542 
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Map 1: UASC moved to a different LA: England 2012 - 2015 
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Appendix 
Location code LA type 
1 London Borough Council 
2 Unitary Authority 
3 Metropolitan District Council 
4 Non-metropolitan District Council 
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i
 An unaccompanied asylum seeking child is defined by UK legal guidance as ‘a child who is 
applying for asylum in their own right and is separated from both parents and is not being 
cared for by an adult who in law or by custom has responsibility to do so’. “Unaccompanied 
child” is used with the same meaning throughout the article for brevity. 
ii
 A ‘care leaver’ is defined as a young person who has reached the age of 18 who was 
previously a child who had been in the care of the LA as defined by the Children Act 1989. 
iii
 It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully address the complex issue of defining the ‘best 
interests’ of children and how this concept is operationalised in policy and practice in the UK. 
A great deal of research has offered critique and recommendations regarding unaccompanied 
children’s best interests (Bhabha 2009; Engebrigtsen 2003; Hek 2012; Kohli 2007; Wright 
2014)  
iv
 Statutory public services are required by law enshrined in legal statutes whereas non-
statutory public services are based on customs, precedents or previous court decisions. Non-
statutory service can include organisations that are funded by government and those that are 
either funded by profits; fundraising or voluntary contributions. 
v
 This lack of knowledge is increasingly problematic due to the changes in statutory duties 
ushered in by the Immigration Act in May 2016. If an unaccompanied child has not made a 
successful protection claim when they reach 18 years old, they will no longer fall under the 
Care Leaver Act but will become a ‘failed adult asylum seeker’ with minimal access to 
support and legal pathways to settlement.   
vi
 Young people who are in need of foster care whether they have migration status issues or 
not, can be subject to out-of-county placements around the UK. However, unaccompanied 
children have specific issues that are exacerbated by movement from their social worker. 
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Social workers consistently stated that the main differences between UASC and other looked 
after children was the lack of history and awareness of the child’s ‘background’. This lack of 
information about a child is intensified by moving young people around the country. 
